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Egypt asks for permission to defend Saudi Arabia

Sisi sought authorization to act “if requested” and “only in defense” of Saudi Arabia, and parliament postponed the vote to October 26, by roll call. On the same day, Yemen counted 53 dead at a recruit camp in al-Alam, the worst Houthi blow since the war returned.

Egypt is not a signatory to the defense pact it is studying joining, has no troops in Yemen and has described in no document the mission for which it sought authorization. Even so, on October 17, 2026, Abdel Fattah al-Sisi brought parliament into an emergency session so the country could act “if requested” and, in his words, “only in defense” of Saudi Arabia. The next day, the National Defence Council promised “all necessary and possible support”, and the House postponed the vote once again: on Monday, October 19, 2026, it closed the session and scheduled the vote for October 26, by roll call and with two-thirds of the 596 deputies, that is, 398 votes.

On the same day Cairo pushed the decision back by a week, the country Egypt says it wants to defend had its worst day since the war returned. A Houthi attack on a police and army training camp in al-Alam, in Jardan district, Shabwa province, killed at least 53 people and wounded more than 200, among them young recruits, according to the Yemeni government recognized by the United Nations (UN).

The week the truce ended

On October 6 and 7, 2026, attacks in Abha killed two women, one Moroccan and one Algerian, and another attack in Riyadh killed a Sudanese citizen. On October 8, 2026, two attacks on the capital’s airport killed three Saudis, one of them the Saudia pilot Hamoud Ali Alkalthami, and damaged an aircraft on the ground. On Saturday, October 10, 2026, a missile hit terminals 3 and 4 of King Khalid International Airport: the Saudi civil aviation authority recorded 12 dead and 309 wounded, among them four Saudis, two Bangladeshis and one citizen from each of six countries — the United States, Egypt, Jordan, Syria, Palestine and Sudan. An injured Indian died the next day, bringing the count to 13. On October 11, 2026, a Pakistani resident was killed and 11 people were wounded in Riyadh, and King Fahd Airport, in Dammam, was also attacked.

On the night of October 13 to 14, the target was the Aramco headquarters, in Dhahran. The Saudi Energy Ministry described a “limited fire,” with no dead or wounded; three sources told Reuters that the fire spread from the sixth to the tenth floor and badly damaged the top of the building. Civil Defense counted four wounded by debris from cruise missiles intercepted over Riyadh and 15 damaged houses. The Houthis claimed the operation as a combined one, with ballistic and cruise missiles and drones, and promised to keep attacking airports and oil facilities. On October 17, the military spokesman Yahya Saree spoke of 53 Saudi airstrikes in Sanaa and six other provinces in the previous 24 hours; Houthi media attributed 12 dead and more than 30 wounded to attacks on residences in Dhamar and Taiz, with no independent confirmation.

The al-Alam camp changes the scale. Three ballistic missiles struck the recruits as they stood in formation, and the wounded were taken to the hospital in Ataq, the provincial capital, where there was a public appeal for blood donations. The government promised to investigate why so many soldiers were exposed within reach of the Houthi arsenal. President Rashad al-Alimi, who telephoned UN Secretary-General António Guterres that same day, asking the organization to designate the Houthis as a foreign terrorist organization, said the target was new recruits and promised a harsh response: “Targeting recruits reflects the Houthi militias’ approach of resorting to cowardly terrorist attacks whenever they face pressure or when their Iran-backed sabotage plans falter.” The Houthi spokesman described the operation as an attack on the “al-Alam camp, run by Saudi officers,” with “dozens killed and wounded” among Saudi forces; the claim that Saudi officers were at the site was not independently confirmed. On October 18, 2026, a Saudi airstrike killed nine people in Yemen, among them five children and two women.

“It is inconceivable that we allow Saudi Arabia, its security or its stability to be hit,” Sisi said. “We are talking only in defense.”

The mandate no one wrote

Sisi spoke at the Military Academy graduation, on the 17th, and the formulation he chose repeats a conditional in every sentence: Egypt would act if requested, under the directives of King Salman and Prince Mohammed bin Salman, only in defense. The next morning, the National Defence Council, chaired by him, linked Saudi security to Egyptian and Arab security and promised support “to defend its security and stability, its resources, its territorial integrity and the Islamic holy sites,” also deciding to intensify diplomatic efforts for de-escalation.

The Presidency statement does not mention troops, and the House, which met in closed session on Sunday, October 18, 2026, and met again on Monday, closed both days without voting. The Constitution requires two-thirds of the deputies, after consultation with the National Defence Council. Government-aligned deputies speak of a “defensive mission”; the document in which it would be defined does not exist in public.

Diplomacy ran in parallel with the postponement. On October 17, 2026, in Baghdad, on the sidelines of the Organization for Islamic Cooperation foreign ministers’ meeting, Egypt and Iran discussed de-escalation and the need to halt the attacks against Saudi Arabia; on Monday, October 19, 2026, Egyptian Foreign Minister Badr Abdelatty telephoned Iranian Abbas Araghchi demanding “de-escalation, negotiation and respect for Gulf security.” Member of Parliament Mostafa Bakry, who announced the postponement, said the government seeks a political solution to the Yemeni crisis and that the two foreign ministers agreed to stay in contact over an initiative to end hostilities against Saudi Arabia and other Arab countries. That is one parliamentarian’s version of the situation, and the text of that initiative has not been made public.

The ground on which Egypt moves is old and familiar. The country has been part of the Saudi-led coalition since 2015, when it intervened in Yemen, with a mostly naval role in the Red Sea and Bab al-Mandab, and has never confirmed ground troops in that country. What changed was the alliance design around it: the Mecca Defense Agreement, signed on August 7, 2026 by Saudi Arabia, Turkey and Pakistan, provides that an armed attack against one of the three be considered an attack against all, and the text was not published. Cairo is studying joining. While it decides, others have already positioned themselves: France began on October 15 to deploy military means to protect Saudi energy infrastructure, with priority for Yanbu, and presents the operation as defensive.

Each side’s vocabulary

The coalition called the October 10, 2026 attack a “war crime” and promised a decisive response through its spokesman Turki al-Malki. The Houthis treat airports and Aramco facilities as “legitimate targets,” and, on October 13, 2026, Saree even asked in a video for staff and residents to move away from them. The Iranian foreign minister, Abbas Araghchi, repeated in Baghdad, on October 17, 2026, that Tehran supports an “inclusive and comprehensive political process as the only practical and sustainable path,” denying involvement in the attacks.

Sergei Lavrov’s tour ended in Tehran. After closing the round of contacts in Bahrain, at the Russia-Gulf Cooperation Council Strategic Dialogue, the Russian foreign minister landed in the Iranian capital on the afternoon of October 19, 2026, on his first visit to the country since February 2025, and met with Araghchi to discuss the war against the United States and attempts to end it. Donald Trump answered about entering the confrontation alongside Riyadh with a conditional sentence, on October 11: “We may. We’re going to look at it.”

On October 14, 2026, Brent closed at US$106.06 and West Texas Intermediate (WTI) at US$95.09; the Saudi Tadawul index fell 1.7%, to 10,139 points, its lowest since March 2023. On Monday, October 19, 2026, Brent fell 1.30%, to US$108.43, after touching US$110 on Friday, October 16, 2026, the highest level since May 2026, and the decline came from the waiver of sanctions on Russia, not from improvement in the Gulf: Gulf oil flows fell to about 8.5 million barrels per day in the seven-day average last week, against more than 20 million the week before, according to the consultancy Kpler. On the humanitarian side, Yemen already totals 5.2 million internally displaced people, to whom were added 128,000 new ones since the start of the September 2026 escalation.

The bill Egypt wants parliament to sign now has a deadline — October 26 — and still lacks its main clause: no one has written whether the Egyptian force will defend cities, ports, oil fields or only the border. In the week Cairo postponed the decision, Yemen produced the argument Sisi does not control: 53 dead in a recruit camp, more than 200 wounded and a government calling for a harsh response and terrorist designation at the UN. The arrangement Cairo holds in its hands, the Mecca pact, was signed without it, and the October 26 vote decides whether Egypt enters the war under a clause yet to be written.

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